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Abstract
Background: The recent Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak, with 28,646 reported cases and 11,323 deaths, was
declared a public health emergency of international interest by the World Health Organisation. In Spain, a single
reported case triggered a public health crisis of a markedly media-centred nature. The approach to the first EVD
epidemic has given rise to various ethical considerations around the world. We address the most relevant ethical
considerations emanating from the management of EVD in Spain.
Main body: Firstly, for reasons of global justice and humanitarian assistance, rich countries have the duty to
support poorer countries in building up their core public-health capacities. Secondly, quarantine for high-risk
contacts might have been a disproportionate and not properly justified measure, which could have contributed
to stigmatising contacts and spreading panic. Thirdly, when the first secondary case was reported in Spain, it is
doubtful whether informed consent requirements were strictly complied with when disclosing information concerning
the alleged accident potentially causing the contagion. Moreover, this information was used by the Regional Health
Minister to blame the patient, evading his responsibility to ensure safe medical procedures for health workers. Finally,
the patient received convalescent plasma for compassionate use from a colleague of the first missionary repatriated,
who also participated in a research study in Spain, despite having previously been denied the chance of being
transferred to Spain to receive treatment. This fact highlights the asymmetry in the relationship between rich and
poor countries.
Short conclusion: The management of this crisis highlighted the technical capacity of the health system and its
professionals to respond effectively to public health emergencies caused by emerging diseases. This said, the
failures in the protection of the EVD patient‘s privacy remind us that this aspect has to be borne in mind from
the outset in crisis situations. Certain coercive measures, such as quarantine, should only be applied where there is
some evidence that the benefit-risk balance could be favourable. Lastly, it is essential that research and interventions
targeted at combating the fragility of the health systems in poor countries respond to reasons of global justice.
Keywords: Ebola, Ethics, Public health, Quarantine, Global justice, Informed consent
Abbreviations: AIDS, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome; EVD, Ebola Virus Disease; HIV, Human Immunodeficiency
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Background
Compared to other endemic diseases in Africa that cause
high morbidity and mortality, such as HIV/AIDS or diar-
rhoeic diseases [1], Ebola virus disease (EVD), with
28,646 reported cases and 11,323 deaths by 29 March
2016, when the World Health Organisation (WHO)
Director-General declared the end of the Public Health
Emergency of International Concern caused by the re-
cent outbreak [2, 3], might be regarded as a small-scale
killer. Nonetheless, the spread of the disease to a num-
ber of countries, its high lethality and the alarmist decla-
rations concerning it, magnified by the news media,
caused a state of panic which, in great measure, influ-
enced the international response [4]. Spain, with a single
reported case [5], in no way remained impervious to this* Correspondence: mroyo@isciii.es1National School of Public Health, Institute of Health Carlos III, 8 Sinesio
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phenomenon, which triggered a public health crisis of a
markedly media-centred nature [6].
The approach to the largest outbreak of EVD in history
has given rise to various ethical considerations, whether
focusing on one specific aspect, such as the use of experi-
mental treatments [7, 8], application of isolation measures
[9], or obligations of developed countries in the fight
against the epidemic [10], or viewed from a broader per-
spective [4, 11–13]. With the end of Ebola transmission in
West Africa, this is a good time to review how situations
with ethical implications were managed during the crisis,
and draw lessons that will enable us to improve monitor-
ing, preparedness and response capabilities vis-à-vis future
public health emergencies [14]. This paper thus seeks to
analyse the most relevant ethical considerations emanat-
ing from the management of EVD in Spain. Without any
pretensions to achieving an exhaustive and complete
account, we will address questions relating to the repatri-
ation of aid workers with EVD, the application of quaran-
tine to high-risk contacts, the dissemination of sensitive
information about patients, and the use of experimental
treatments.
Discussion
Repatriation of EVD sufferers
On 7 August 2014, a male missionary nurse who worked
at a Monrovia hospital (Liberia) was repatriated to Spain
to be treated for EVD at the hospital Carlos III in Madrid.
In contrast, some of their work colleagues who belonged
to their religious order and had also been affected had to
remain in Liberia since they did not possess Spanish
nationality. Whereas the Spanish missionary died on 12
August, a female colleague of his, who was denied to be
transferred to Spain for treatment, was admitted to Elwa
public hospital-a barrack-like building where patients were
crowded together without the necessary therapeutic and
hygienic conditions-managed to survive the disease and
on 25 August walked out of the “death camp”, as it was
called by the locals [15]. On 21 September, a missionary
physician was repatriated to Spain from Sierra Leone, in
order to be treated for EVD at the hospital Carlos III,
where he died 4 days later.
The repatriation of missionaries responds to our obli-
gation, as a society, to provide the best care available to
aid workers who, through supererogatory actions in the
name of solidarity, are willing to place their lives at risk
in order to help others [16]. Repatriation also benefits
the rest of the patients, by maximising the probability
that their caregivers will survive and minimising the risk
of dissuading other professionals who might otherwise
be considering the possibility of travelling to the area to
help with their care [17]. Spanish law recognises the
right of aid workers to repatriation in the event of acci-
dent or severe disease. To cover the cost of repatriation,
humanitarian aid agencies must previously take out an
insurance policy that covers the expenses of their
workers [18]. In the apparent absence of the necessary
insurance policy in the case of the Ebola-stricken mis-
sionaries who were transferred to Spain, it was the state
that paid the costs of their repatriation, waiving the right
to have these reimbursed by the religious order [19].
The repatriation of missionaries raises the question of
the different treatment accorded to Spanish aid workers
and the African health workers, who were on the front
line and were the principal victims of infection [10]. It
seems clear that the duty of attending to health workers
who risk their lives falls to their respective countries of
origin. However, given the enormous shortages faced by
such states and the profound world-wide inequality in
the distribution of resources, even those most leery of
the blessings of international aid acknowledge the exist-
ence of global interdependence (social, economic, phys-
ical and moral) [20] and the obligations of rich countries
to poorer countries. These obligations should offset the
injustices that prevent people from leading a minimally
decent life regardless of their place of birth, an example of
this being the existence of fragile health systems which
have been the determinants of the spread of the current
Ebola outbreak [10]. In addition to the reasons of global
justice, most people recognise that individuals and soci-
eties have an obligation to provide humanitarian assist-
ance to others when the cost of this burden is minimal
[10]. In the mid and long term, this amounts to helping to
strengthen these countries‘ health systems but, in the
midst of the crisis, the priority lies in providing the neces-
sary health-care personnel, training and technical means
to combat the epidemic, while reinforcing patient treat-
ment capabilities and the control of transmission chain
[21]. Indeed, this is what the WHO Member States
agreed upon in the International Health Regulations
some 10 years ago, by undertaking to support develop-
ing countries in building up their core public-health
capacities [22]. Countries which had an important pres-
ence and a certain logistic infrastructure in the area
were the first to take steps in this direction [23]. The
case of Cuba, a country without interests in the region,
which sent a sizeable contingent of health professionals
to the affected area, is particularly laudable [24]. Two
independent groups of experts have set up similar
recommendations to counter the threat of infectious dis-
eases crisis in the future [25, 26]. The global community
should set a strategy to develop countries’ public-health
capacities by promoting investment by local governments,
providing technical and funding support when needed,
and ensuring external assessment of national capacities. In
addition, WHO should create a Centre for Health Emer-
gency Preparedness and Response, put aside a contingency
fund, establish effective mechanisms for coordination,
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escalation and cooperation with regional networks and
non-state actors in health crisis, and help to enable and ac-
celerate research.
Other controversial aspects of the repatriation were
the financial cost of the operation and the risk of intro-
ducing an infectious agent into a country that was free
of the disease and had negligible experience in its man-
agement [27, 28]. Furthermore, doubts were raised as to
whether the level of suitability of infrastructures and
training of professionals in Spain was optimal for hand-
ling this type of patient [29]. Specifically, the hospital
unit equipped to deal with infectious emergencies was in
the process of being dismantled and its reopening had to
be quickly improvised in order to care for the repatriated
patients. Hence, one has to ask oneself about possible al-
ternative actions that might have guaranteed the mis-
sionaries a level of care equivalent to what they would
have received in Spain but left them in West Africa,
such as dispatching a health-care team with the neces-
sary means to set up a field hospital, something which
was indeed proposed by some public health experts at
the time and from which many other patients might well
have benefited [30]. The financial cost of such an aid ac-
tion on the ground can be very variable [31] but is esti-
mated to exceed 3 million euros [32], a figure higher than
the total cost of repatriation and treatment in Europe,
which is also very variable but is nevertheless put at
slightly over one million euros [33]. Even so, this is a min-
imal sum for a high-income country such as ours, which,
just a few weeks after a number of public health experts
had called on European governments to request urgent aid
to control the epidemic in Africa [34], allocated 7 million
euros to funding prevention projects in EVD outbreak-
affected countries and their border areas [35]. This sum is
approximately half the budget allocated at the time to
meeting the needs arising from the EVD outbreak in
Spain, without taking into account the resources allocated
by regional authorities to preparing the staff and facilities
of countless hospitals to treat Ebola patients, when the vast
majority of these will never get to see a single case [36].
Following repatriation of Spanish personnel who had be-
come infected, Spain contributed additional funds through
the European Union and sent a group of epidemiologists
to the affected area.
Lastly, the use of exceptional protection measures during
repatriation —disproportionate in relation to the risk of
transmission of the virus—and their dissemination by the
mass media were questioned by some experts, who warned
of the risk of transmitting a distorted perception of the risk
and thereby contributing to the population’s panic [37].
Quarantining of high-risk contacts
On October 6, 2014, a secondary case was reported in
Spain, caused by the first known human-to-human
transmission of Ebola virus disease outside Africa [5].
The patient was an assistant nurse who had cared for
the two missionaries repatriated from West Africa. Al-
though symptom-onset occurred on 29 September and
the patient telephoned the prevention unit of the hos-
pital where she worked on the following day, she was
not diagnosed until 1 week later. The ultimate reasons
for this delay are not entirely clear, but were seemingly
related in the initial stages to a “wait-and-see” attitude
to vague symptoms, with fever that failed to reach the
level established in the protocol for case-definition
purposes [5, 38, 39]. The patient subsequently went to her
primary care centre on her own initiative but failed to re-
port her previous contact with Ebola patients and was pre-
scribed paracetamol [40]. Over the course of the following
days, there was a repetition of the telephone contacts be-
tween the patient and the Madrid Health Service but it
was not until 6 October, after the symptoms had become
exacerbated, that she was finally admitted to the hospital
[41]. Experiences like this have shown that, in a sporadic
case context, diagnostic criteria ought to be applied with
greater flexibility than in an epidemic context, with the
protocols for investigating possible cases having been
amended to enhance their sensitivity when it comes to
detecting Ebola patients [39].
Disproportionate and sensationalist mass media cover-
age plus ineffective communication during the first days
after the assistant nurse had tested positive contributed to
widespread panic [6]. After some initial confusion, during
which the health authorities transmitted the sensation that
they were incapable of controlling the situation created by
the infection of the female health worker, the our govern-
ment reacted in a co-ordinated manner in response to the
surveillance system’s slowness to detect the contagion and
the ensuing alarm caused by the situation. On the one
hand, it set up a national Ebola management committee
[42], which immediately implemented a comprehensive
and transparent communication campaign, one of the first
measures recommended by the experts to reduce confu-
sion [16]; and on the other, it implemented a new version
of the EVD- protocol, with substantial changes in the
contact monitoring and surveillance procedure [39, 43].
The modifications to the protocol included the following,
seemingly reasonable, measures: changing the clinical cri-
teria used to define cases under investigation to enhance
diagnostic sensitivity; providing instructions for evaluating
the fever on an individualised basis; notifying primary and
specialised care centres of any persons subject to surveil-
lance by reason of their status as Ebola case contacts; and
requiring all such contacts to report any travel outside
their region of residence, during which time they would
be expected to remain permanently reachable by tele-
phone, and in the event of needing medical attention, to
inform their monitoring officer prior to seeking care.
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Furthermore, quarantine for high-risk contacts was estab-
lished on the grounds of avoiding any risk of diagnostic
delay -such as that which occurred in the case of the in-
fected assistant nurse- and facilitating rapid isolation. One
would nevertheless have to ask whether quarantine was a
reasonable, proportional measure. Although the scientific
evidence shows that asymptomatic persons are not conta-
gious [44] and that the risk of spread is low during the
early febrile phase of illness [45], it may nonetheless be
reasonable to adopt a more aggressive attitude to this
marginal risk in the context of sporadic cases than in that
of an epidemic. Based on this same evidence, however, the
previous version of the Spanish protocol noted that there
was no transmissibility in the incubation period and made
no provision for the possibility of quarantine for high risk
contacts [39]. This was precisely the line of reasoning pur-
sued by a District Court to reject an application by the
governor of Maine (USA) for quarantine to be imposed
on a female nurse who had returned from Sierra Leone,
where she had gone with Médecins Sans Frontières to help
combat the EVD outbreak [46]. Firstly, in addition to
restricting individual rights, quarantine can contribute to
stigmatising contacts, inducing some to conceal their con-
dition, and to undermining health professionals’ willing-
ness to treat patients, which would result in a diminished
capacity to combat the epidemic [47, 48]. Although we do
not know this with certainty, the introduction of quaran-
tine would possibly contribute to the stigmatisation of
contacts and their families observed in Spain [41]. Sec-
ondly, quarantine diverts resources which could be used
to combat in more effective ways the epidemic or attend
to other urgent health needs [49]. In Spain, high-risk con-
tacts were given the choice of home or hospital quarantine
and all of them opted for hospital quarantine, citing
among other reasons the fear of infecting family members,
in spite of the fact that, apparently, no appropriate justifi-
cation for quarantine was given to them [50]. Extraordin-
ary measures such as quarantine unsupported by scientific
evidence could perhaps be justified during a crisis, if these
served to control the emergency by preventing the spread
of panic. Yet one would equally need to have some kind of
evidence to show the capacity of quarantine to generate
trust in the population or when it comes to applying the
precautionary principle [51]. However, the issue of contra-
dictory messages by the health authorities would be ex-
pected to give rise to confusion and mistrust in the
population: by repeatedly laying stress on the fact that the
disease is exclusively transmitted by direct contact with pa-
tients who already present with symptoms of the disease
and yet at the same time placing asymptomatic contacts in
quarantine, one is giving to understand that the latter also
pose a risk of contagion to the remainder of the population.
The fact that all the high-risk contacts voluntarily opted for
hospital-based quarantine, including health professionals,
suggests that this measure failed to improve the popu-
lation’s perception of risk. Our experience during EVD
patient-management training courses, held at the re-
quest of the special Ebola Management Committee at
the National School of Public Health from 15 October
2014, with the aim of reinforcing the training of bio-
health professionals [52], indicated that an altered per-
ception of the risk persisted among some professionals,
as a result of the panic situation created, an impression
that was shared by other professionals involved in the
management of the crisis [6]. Lastly, though there was
a delay in the diagnosis of the case, attributable to a sur-
veillance system failure, the remaining measures listed
above appeared to be sufficient to remedy the shortfalls
detected without any need to resort to quarantine. A
country such as Spain, with an almost universal, largely
state-run health system of acknowledged quality [53], is
able to put in place those measures albeit with one serious
drawback, ie, that immigrants without residence permits
have been practically excluded from the health system
since 2012 [54]. Furthermore, despite the fact that, legally
speaking, exclusion from the health system would in no
way affect high-risk public health situations, many immi-
grants have nevertheless assumed that they are totally
excluded. Consequently, such exclusion, aside from being
enormously unjust, poses evident difficulties for epide-
miological and public health surveillance of potentially
imported diseases like EVD. Quarantine decisions must be
based on science and not on panic or hysteria [55]. In
public health crisis, with distorted public perceptions of
risk and lack of evidence regarding which method can be
more effective to control the situation, governments can
appeal to the precautionary principle. However, before
opting for extreme coercive measures, such as quarantine,
alternative courses of action can be explored using the
principle of least restrictive or coercive means, like offer-
ing quarantine on a voluntary basis versus monitoring
fever and other clinical symptoms through daily at home
visits by health professionals. Whatever the case, a public
and transparent justification of a very cautious approach,
with measures that go beyond what would be strictly
needed in terms of potential risk, would prevent popula-
tion and health professionals from mistrusting health au-
thorities for contradictory messages. Otherwise, one could
be contributing to create a state of opinion not altogether
averse to restrictions being placed, without the necessary
justification, on personal freedom in crisis situations. The
case of the Aliens Internment Centre in Aluche, a Madrid
neighbourhood, where a group of immigrants was totally
unjustifiably and arbitrarily kept in isolation for 18 h with-
out receiving sustenance of any kind, should serve as a
warning of the risk of allowing oneself to be swayed by
panic when it comes to taking decisions in emergency
situations [56].
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Dissemination of sensitive information
The EVD episode in Spain has highlighted the need to
pay more attention to the mechanisms required to en-
sure patient privacy in crisis situations. The name of the
patient affected was made public from the very start
[57]. However, some persons whose participation in the
crisis aroused media interest, such as the primary care
physician who attended to the patient days before she was
diagnosed, managed to keep their identity private. This
shows that the privacy of patients and health professionals
affected by a public health crisis can be ensured without
necessarily curtailing the right to information of public
interest.
Two days after making the patient’s name public, the
medical team at the EVD-reference hospital in Madrid,
acting with the patient’s express consent, publicly re-
vealed information concerning the alleged accident that
could have caused the contagion. According to these
statements, made at the hospital entrance a short while
after having talked to the patient various times and ask-
ing for her consent to release the details, the patient had
acknowledged that she might have touched her face with
the gloves when she was removing the personal protect-
ive equipment (PPE) which she had donned to attend to
the second of the repatriated health workers. Subse-
quently, the patient issued other statements in which
she did not admit to this accident and, on being asked
again by her medical team, said that she felt confused
about the matter [58]. This incident raises at least two
questions:
1. Was the patient’s consent to disclose the information
regarding the possible accident that might have
caused contagion an autonomous decision? In order
for informed consent to be considered valid, three
conditions must be met [59]: (a) the patient must
have sufficient information about the consequences of
the decision to be taken; (b) the patient must be able
to understand the relevant information and decide in
accordance with his/her preferences; and, (c) the
decision must be taken voluntarily, in the absence of
internal and external coercion. Bearing in mind the
sheer magnitude of the media circus that surrounded
the case, the social alarm and panic generated, and
the patient’s clinical condition (ie, she had been
diagnosed with a highly lethal disease), it is doubtful
whether these requirements were strictly complied
with. However preserved the patient’s ability to
comprehend, possibly neither the patient nor the
medical team who attended to her could have
foreseen the consequences of disclosing the above
information. Furthermore, the coercion stemming
from the enormous pressure exerted by the media
and the patient’s personal and professional circle,
highlighted by her contradictory statements, raises
doubts about the degree to which her decision was
voluntary.
2. What was the purpose of publicly disclosing the
above information so hastily? At that particular
point in time, identifying a possibility of infection
was of great importance to all professionals who
were attending Ebola patients, since it reduced
suspicion of the PPE’s inability to afford protection.
What is not so clear is whether this information was
relevant to the general public. In the context of
confusion and social alarm, it could be understood
as a measure intended to combat panic, and
transmit trust and confidence to the population,
showing that the source of the contagion had been
discovered and that the situation was under control.
Nevertheless, far from helping to allay panic, the
statements instead served to spark off a media and
political scramble in search of a culprit to blame for
what had occurred, thereby doing irreparable harm
to the investigation targeted at clarifying what had
happened [60]. The Madrid Regional Health
Minister used this revelation to blame the patient
publicly for what had occurred, accusing her via
television of lying, concealing information and
incompetence, with derogatory comments such as,
“One doesn”t need a Master’s degree to understand
how to put on and take off a suit but some people
are undoubtedly quicker to learn than others” [61].
Some communication media sympathetic to the
government fanned the fire, by blaming and
stigmatising the victim, accusing her of being
imprudent and putting many people at risk, in a
strategy that appeared to be designed to deflect
the blame and shield the health authorities [62].
If the alleged accident that might have caused the
contagion did indeed take place during the removal
of the PPE, then this must have happened as a result
of unintentional carelessness by the patient within
an overall context of flaws in the protective
procedures and means available, especially a lack
of an adequate supervision, which are ultimately to
blame for the alleged failure, a point repeatedly
made by some of the health professionals at the
hospital [63]. In neither of these two cases can
blame or responsibility be attached to the patient
for the accident or its consequences. What is in
fact called for here is to implement systems
that are designed to prevent errors and, in a worst
case scenario, are able to detect and correct them
before they cause any harm [64]. Indeed, if the
PPE-removal protocol had been appropriate, the
accident should have been detected at the time it
happened. The focus must be on system errors
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rather than personal errors [65]. However, the
regional government, in charge of direct health
care of Ebola patients, rather than admitting its
responsibility for not preventing the contagion
blamed and shamed the patient for it, without any
compensation for the damage inflicted. It is true
that the patient was to blame for her failure to
disclose to the primary care centre that she had
been in contact with infected people. But, even so,
an active surveillance system of high-risk contacts
at that time should have prevented this forgetfulness
from happening.
The final invasion of the patient’s privacy took place
when a number of news media published a Reuters
News Agency photograph taken with a telephoto zoom
lens, showing the assistant nurse in her hospital room
[66]. Some media afterwards withdrew the photograph,
including El País, one of Spain’s leading mass-circulation
dailies, which publicly acknowledged that the image
should not have been published and issued an apology
to its readers via a “tweet” [67]. Although some legal and
other experts invoke the right to information on the
grounds of the public interest in the case, the majority
opinion was that the photograph should never have been
published, since it was breach of the patient’s right to
privacy and image (personality) rights [68].
Use of experimental treatments
The first repatriated patient received ZMapp. The patient
who was a secondary case received two experimental treat-
ments, namely, convalescent plasma collected from two
EVD survivors and high-dose favipiravir [40]. Although
these patients gave their informed consent to receiving
these experimental treatments, they were for compassion-
ate use, which meant that they were not within the frame-
work of any clinical trial. Such a compassionate use had
not been previously evaluated by a research ethics com-
mittee. Nevertheless, the pertinent research ethics com-
mittee did discuss the application of treatments for future
potential patients. In defence of the clinicians who were
tasked with caring for the patient, it is very difficult to take
the stance of positioning the experimental treatments
within the framework of a clinical trial in a situation
where there is only one patient with the disease and it
is practically impossible to organise a multinational
clinical trial within the space of a few days. Evaluation
by a clinical research ethics committee, advisable in
compassionate use but not required by the Spanish law,
would certainly have been more feasible, despite the
rapidity required to formulate the possible benefits and
risks of experimental treatments and then discuss the
matter at a committee meeting. During the secondary
case’s clinical disease course, she presented with an
acute respiratory distress syndrome which met the
diagnostic criteria for possible transfusion-related acute
lung injury, after receiving five units of convalescent
plasma from two different EVD survivors, though the
possibility that this might have been secondary to EVD
cannot be ruled out [40].
The case of the Spanish assistant nurse raises an add-
itional question, since one of the donors of the plasma
received was a work colleague and member of same reli-
gious order as the first missionary repatriated, who had
managed to survive in Liberia after she had been denied
the chance of being transferred to Spain to receive treat-
ment. Yet, once she had recovered from the disease,
when her serum could potentially serve to treat other
patients, she was transferred to Spain [69] and not only
donated her serum, but also participated in a study to
investigate what the best time would be for extracting
the plasma from convalescent patients [70]. Regardless
of the source of the funding for transferring the female
missionary, these facts highlight an asymmetry in the re-
lationship between rich and poor countries, which could
contribute to generating mistrust and opposition to fu-
ture research initiatives in these countries, due to fear of
possible exploitation of the affected parties. The USA
government has invested considerable money in recent
years in treatments and vaccines for Ebola, seeing it as a
threat to its national security [71]. Even so, in order to
eradicate the terrible social inequalities that bar many per-
sons from aspiring to a minimally decent life, it is essential
that research and interventions targeted at combating the
fragility of the health systems in poor countries respond to
reasons of global justice.
Conclusions
In crisis situations, the speed in response coupled with the
ability to adapt swiftly to changing situations are some of
the keys to success. In the case before us, despite the ini-
tial confusion, associated with failures in communication,
the immediate implementation of a centralised, compre-
hensive and transparent communication campaign, with
spokespersons being chosen in accordance with their
technical and scientific profiles, helped restore part of the
population’s lost confidence. This would appear to indi-
cate that something has been learnt from communication
failures in previous crises, such as that which marked mad
cow disease [72]. The continuous updating of the Ebola
patient management protocol, by adapting and improving
it with the aid of contributions made by experts from
different disciplines in line with newly received data and
experience gained in the management of patients and con-
tacts, is yet another indicator of the system’s organisa-
tional capacity to respond swiftly and effectively to new,
rapidly changing challenges through co-ordinated actions.
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This said, the management of this crisis has also
highlighted some areas for improvement, particularly
those relating to the ethical considerations inherent in
some of the public health measures applied. The ser-
ious failures that occurred in the protection of the EVD
patient’s privacy are a good example of this, while the
fact that private information about other persons in-
volved in the crisis was not divulged shows that it is
possible to protect the confidentiality of affected parties
in crisis situations if this aspect is borne in mind from
the outset. Certain measures not supported by scientific
evidence, such as the quarantining of EVD high-risk
contacts, should only be applied, publicly and transpar-
ently, on the basis of the precautionary principle, where
there is some evidence that the benefit-risk balance could
be favourable. But this was not so clear in this particular
case, where similar level of protection of population and
health professionals could have been reached with less
restrictive measures, preventing from the risk of distrust
of health authorities caused by contradictory messages.
Failure to do so entails the risk of contributing to create a
state of opinion favourably disposed towards restrictions
being placed on personal freedoms without any real justi-
fication in crisis situations.
Lastly, the fragility of poor countries’ health systems
has been pinpointed as being one of the principal limita-
tions of the global capacity to respond to international
public health emergencies [14]. To date, rich countries’
response to such shortcomings and the need to conduct
research into treatments and vaccines for endemic dis-
eases in poor countries has essentially been the product
of self-interest, for legitimate reasons of global security,
which is primarily aimed at protecting the citizens of
these countries against threats arising beyond their fron-
tiers. However, the only way to put an end to the enor-
mous social inequalities that underlie this fragility and
achieve a sustained, meaningful improvement in global
health and the international response capacity to public
health emergencies, lies in tackling the above-mentioned
challenges from the standpoint of solidarity and global
justice. Regarding Spain, where the epidemic will likely
never break out, part of the funds wasted preparing the
staff and facilities of countless hospitals to treat Ebola
patients would have better been used to help combat the
epidemic in Africa. Unlike other countries, such as Cuba
or the UK, the Spanish government did not encourage
the staff of the National Health System to volunteer in
stopping the outbreak in Africa. To help in countering
the threat of infectious-diseases crisis and reducing
avoidable suffering in the future, Spain should join the
global community efforts to develop countries’ public-
health capacities, providing technical and funding sup-
port to poor countries when needed and supporting the
WHO’s leadership role in this challenge.
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